p erhaps the premier development in international trade theory over the last fifteen years has been the industrial-organization literature in which scale economies, imperfect competition, and multinational firms have been added to the more traditional positive theories of trade. The positive literature developed simultaneously with a normative, policy-oriented literature which seeks to understand how these industrial-organization features of economies modify our standard policy prescriptions.
L Introduction p
erhaps the premier development in international trade theory over the last fifteen years has been the industrial-organization literature in which scale economies, imperfect competition, and multinational firms have been added to the more traditional positive theories of trade. The positive literature developed simultaneously with a normative, policy-oriented literature which seeks to understand how these industrial-organization features of economies modify our standard policy prescriptions.
Inherent complexities of increasing-returns technologies and imperfectly-competitive behavior have restricted much of this literature to very simple models with highly restrictive assumptions. The purpose of this paper is to take a relatively modest step in addressing one of the more objectionable simplifying assumptions of the trade-industrial-organization literature: the nature of entry and exit decisions by firms.
Two approaches to entry and exit decisions have been adopted in the literature. The first is to simply assume that there is no entry or exit. This approach is perhaps best represented by series of papers by Brander and Spencer in the 1980s [e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985; Spencer and Brander, 1983] . While important insights emerge concerning duopolistic interaction and the impact of policy on that interaction, this literature misses some of the important dynamic aspects of competition that we have witnessed in industries such as aircraft, computers, and semiconductors. A second approach is to assume that there is a continuum of firms, such that the number of firms can take on any non-integer value. This has the advantage of permitting equilibrium to be found by solving a system of continuous, differentiable, simultaneous equations (a zero profit equation being associated with the variable n, the number of firms).
Venables [1985] and Horstmann and Markusen [1986] use this approach in oligopoly models, and it is of course the standard approach in the entire monopolistic-competition literature [e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Helpman, 1981] . The disadvantage of this approach is that it avoids the lumpiness which is the key aspect of increasing returns in the first place! From a policy point of view, we have to worry that we might be getting some very misleading conclusions from either type of model. Following a trade liberalization, for example, "marginalist" considerations might dictate expanding production in Region A, while "global" maximization might dictate closing the plant in Region A. This paper will build upon our previous work which adds multinational decision-making to the existing body of theory, and examines that theory in an applied general-equilibrium model of the North American auto industry [Lozep-de-Silanes et al., 1994a , 1994b Markusen et al., 1993] . Because of the inherent complexities of integerprogramming problems, we make a modest beginning in this paper. Following trade liberalization within North America (motivated by the NAFTA), we allow one firm to endogenously choose among 15 alternative plant-location configurations. The other firms retain their existing numbers of and locations for their plants, but endogenously adjust their outputs, markups, and shipment patterns.
Several results emerge from the applied general-equilibrium model. First, we have considerable difficulty in calibrating the model such that the initial plant configuration (plants in all countries) represents an equilibrium. This suggests that production is excessively geographically diversified initially, perhaps due to historical factors involving the forced development of the auto sectors in Canada and Mexico. A calibration in which the mobile firm does optimize by choosing the initial configuration required a significant degree of sunk costs (about 40 percent of fixed costs must be written off in plant closures) and high transport costs or non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on inactive trade links.
Second, we get the unsurprising result that production becomes more concentrated as trade barriers are lowered. But third, we also observe a more interesting "non-monotonicity" result that a plant
